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I. INTRODUCTION
As some political jurisdictions move toward marijuana legalization,
decriminalization, or some other mixed form of tolerance for mari-
juana-related activities,1 the properties associated with these activities
will encounter myriad legal issues. Although some of these issues
might be unique to pot-related properties,2 most of the issues are both
predictable and often old, tested problems simply applied to new, yet
disruptive circumstances. Hence, this Article will often evoke the tune
that “everything old is new again.”3
Regulatory responses, neighborhood disputes, permit battles, and
opposition coalitions are all predictable both as a matter of logical
analysis in light of legal standards but also, very importantly, due to
* Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development and Professor of Law,
Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. Email: kochan@chapman.edu. I
wish to thank Regina Zernay and Susan Nikdel for helpful research assistance; Jen-
nifer Spinella and Shelley Ross Saxer for helpful comments and suggestions; and the
participants at the Symposium on “The Blunt Truth: Looking at the Effects of Mari-
juana Law on Property Interests” for their instructive presentations and comments,
and the editors of the Texas A&M Journal of Property Law for hosting the Sympo-
sium and for their excellent editorial assistance.
1. See Gina K. Grimes & Morris C. Massey, Medical Marijuana: Differences
Among States’ Regulatory Frameworks and Land Use and Zoning Regulations, PROB.
& PROP., Nov./Dec. 2015, at 45 (describing the differences between the 23 states and
the District of Columbia with some form of legalized marijuana use (including two
with recreational use legalized) over types of regulation and how much regulation is
state-based versus how much is done by localities).
2. “Pot” is a common term used for “marijuana of any sort.” Pot, URBAN DIC-
TIONARY (June, 16, 2002), http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=pot.
3. Peter Allen & Carole Bayer Sager, Everything Old Is New Again, on Conti-
nental American (A & M Records 1974).
35
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the lessons of history.4 It is useful then to borrow yet another
phrase—for pot and property, “what’s past is prologue.”5 In that light,
this Article will use history as a means of identifying some of the pre-
cursors to pot-related property law conflicts. One thing is for sure, we
must know and evaluate how property law has dealt with similar dis-
ruptive forces in the past if we are to understand how it will deal with
pot as the new disruptor and as one of land use law’s newest objects of
analysis.6
This Article is entirely agnostic with respect to the issue of whether
we should or should not decriminalize, legalize, or otherwise increase
legal tolerance for marijuana or any other drugs. One need not discuss
these merits to process what property problems and possibilities might
emerge when any of those law-relaxation efforts are enacted. But, as
society seems to increasingly tolerate marijuana, we undoubtedly will
encounter more pot-related property uses in need of analysis.7 We will
be faced with both legal and political regulatory choices as we attempt
to integrate the uses of properties associated with marijuana—for use,
growing, cultivation, processing, distribution, dispensing, sale, kitch-
ens (for the preparation of edible products), and business offices—
with other competing and coordinating uses of the places where such
pot-related properties exist.8
4. Patricia E. Salkin & Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning: Can
You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?, 62 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. No. 8, 3, 4–6 (Aug.
2010) (surveying licensing and permitting requirements for marijuana land uses);
Grimes & Massey, supra note 1, at 46 (explaining the variety of state and local land
use regulations in place for marijuana-related properties, including bans, limits on the
number of dispensaries, restrictions on ownership, and location restrictions). One au-
thor draws the same line between temporally distant regulatory frameworks, but fo-
cuses his comparative efforts on the effectiveness of “localism” rather than
comparative analysis of land use options. See Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Localism,
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719, 724 (2015) (“It is, of course, far too early to gauge the
impact of local marijuana regulations. But we do have more than one century worth
of experience with local alcohol regulations.”). Mikos is primarily focused on alcohol
as a case study on whether localities should have the authority to regulate the distri-
bution of the good rather than on the types of land use controls that can be used to so
regulate. See id. at 725 (focus of the article is on “who should decide” how to regulate
marijuana).
5. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sec. 1; see also ALDOUS HUX-
LEY, THE DEVILS OF LOUDUN 259 (Harper ed. 1952) (“The charm of history and its
enigmatic lesson consist in the fact that, from age to age, nothing changes and yet
everything is completely different.”).
6. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON, OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN
PROGRESS: REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284 (Scribner’s 2d ed. 1922) (“Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”); cf. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 1 (1964) (“although history never quite repeats itself, and
just because no development is inevitable, we can in a measure learn from the past to
avoid a repetition of the same process.”).
7. Grimes & Massey, supra note 1, at 47 (counseling that real estate practitioners
need to become knowledgeable about the marijuana regulatory framework).
8. Michael Polson, Land and Law in Marijuana Country: Clean Capital, Dirty
Money, and the Drug War’s Rentier Nexus, 36 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOL-
OGY REV. 215, 220 (Nov. 2013) (exploring ways in which “marijuana as a land use
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This Article will examine the tensions from a number of levels, in-
cluding: in Part II, pot-related property usage as a vehicle of disrup-
tion; in Part III, the regulation of pot-related properties through
judicial land-use controls such as nuisance; through private land-use
controls and consensual agreements; and through public land-use con-
trols and coercive enforcement, including the distinctive characteris-
tics of zoning, permitting, and licensing regimes; in Part IV, the
lessons from interest group theory about the coalitions that will be
formed and the political dynamics that will surround property law de-
velopments spurred specifically by pot-related issues regarding prop-
erty uses; and finally in Part V, how pot changes a “place,” “space,” or
the community as a whole.
One potentially deep wrinkle for even successful state marijuana
reforms emerges from the Controlled Substances Act,9 which still con-
siders marijuana a Schedule 1 drug, and, therefore, federal law still
prohibits the possession, importation, distribution, and sale of mari-
juana.10 Yet, more than twenty-three states and the District of Colum-
bia have some form of relaxed marijuana laws moving away from
criminalization.11 The fact that current U.S. Department of Justice
policy favors exercising discretionary power against federal enforce-
ment of federal law in states that have relaxed marijuana laws12 does
not change the statutory determination of federal “illegality.”
Thus, any study of the law’s reaction to new marijuana-related land
uses necessarily involves complications associated with the manner in
which we define “legal” or “lawful” (or, if you prefer, how we define
“illegal” or “unlawful”). At their core, such determinations can have
dramatic property-related effects. Many leases, covenants, defeasible
fees, zoning ordinances, and nuisance elements—to name a few—
often include such terms or depend on findings related to such terms
for their application or enforceability. For instance, it is often said that
one cannot lease property for an illegal purpose. Lease terms often
prohibit lessees from conducting illegal activities. Illegality may be the
competes with other potential land uses”); see also Seth M. Low & Denise Lawrence-
Zúñiga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING
CULTURE 19 (Seth M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga eds., 2003) (“Urban environ-
ments provide frequent opportunities for spatial contests because of their complex
structures and differentiated social entities that collude and compete for control over
material and symbolic resources.”).
9. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–971, § 812(c), Sched. I(c)(10) (2012).
10. § 812(c), Sched. I(c)(10).
11. Grimes & Massey, supra note 1, at 45; see also Mikos, supra note 4, at 719
(“More than 20 states have already legalized marijuana for some purposes under state
law, and the number is sure to grow.”).
12. See, e.g., Memorandum for Selected U.S. Attorneys from Deputy Attorney
Gen. David Ogden to U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/
memorandum-selected-united-state-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states
(“provid[ing] clarification and guidance to federal prosecutors in states that have en-
acted laws authorizing the medical use of marijuana”).
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very express reason that a real covenant is broken or a defeasible fee
undone. Illegal activities may immediately violate zoning laws as writ-
ten. Illegal activities may be nuisances per se in some jurisdictions.13
And, in many of these property forms, terms must be interpreted and
enforced according to the original intentions of the parties or drafters.
But, did such persons expect to fix the universe of “illegality” in a set
time period as well or allow that term to be fluid? Even if the applica-
tion of the “illegality” term in such property forms is fluid, there is still
the problem that the federal government’s statutory mandate (imbued
with the Supremacy Clause) has not changed. So, to complicate mat-
ters even further, if a state says marijuana is legal for state purposes, is
it “legal” for all of these other property form purposes, especially
when engaging with marijuana in a variety of ways on one’s land or in
one’s business affairs is still illegal under federal law? While the sub-
stance of the term “illegal” is an interesting one to ponder, this Article
will not address it further. Issues regarding the duty to enforce federal
law, federalism, the Supremacy Clause, federal-state preemption, and
similar concerns are also beyond the scope of this Article.14 Further-
more, this Article will not discuss intersections with criminal law, state
preemption of local law, or the details of constitutional barriers to lo-
cal land-use regulatory options to control marijuana-related uses.
II. INCUMBENT LANDSCAPES, LEGALITY INNOVATION,
AND DISRUPTIVE USES
We can learn quite a bit about shifting land use policy—necessitated
by the relatively radical introduction of previously unacceptable, in-
deed illegal, activities into the land use mix—through the lens of the
emerging scholarship on theories of disruption and disruptive
innovation.15
13. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining stance of one city (San Jose,
California) that cultivation, sale and use of marijuana is a nuisance because it violates
federal law). While Saxer recognizes that properly licensed retail liquor stores cannot
generally be held as a nuisance per se, the same may not hold true for marijuana
stores which, at least under federal law, are illegal. See Shelley Ross Saxer, “Down
With Demon Drink!”: Strategies for Resolving Liquor Outlet Overconcentration in Ur-
ban Areas, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123, 173 (1994) [hereinafter Saxer, Strategies]
(“the lawful operation of a properly licensed retail liquor outlet cannot be considered
a nuisance per se, ‘since that which the law authorizes to be done, if done as the law
authorizes, is not such a nuisance.’ Therefore, in the typical land use nuisance case,
the nuisance alleged is per accidents.”).
14. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Mari-
juana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015) (analyzing the important and complex
federal-state conflicts and federalism concerns associated with changes in marijuana
laws).
15. Neil Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1685
(2014) (“Disruption: In the past two decades, the concept has gone from theory, to
buzz word, to the captivation of the popular imagination.”).
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The theory of disruption, broadly understood, provides lessons for,
and is applicable to, the introduction of new products, uses, entrants,
or the like into an existing industry or environment where such intro-
duction potentially threatens the continued viability or construction of
existing industries or environments.16 Cortez for example, posits that
“[d]isruption theory tells us that certain innovations can undermine
existing products, firms, or even entire industries.”17
Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen are credited with first intro-
ducing the idea of “disruptive technologies” into our business and ec-
onomic discourse, explaining how new technologies that are
dramatically different from existing ones can fundamentally alter the
marketplace.18 Christensen, in particular, has refined the theory over
the years by broadening its application to what he called “disruptive
innovation,” a more expansive term acknowledging that business
models and other market breakthroughs (in addition to technology)
could also act as disruptive forces with similar effects and concerns.19
That moniker has been extended even more broadly to label these
particular insights more simply as “disruption theory,” which, as Cor-
tez explains, provides “explanatory power [that] extends to many [ ]
products and industries [and] has inspired prolific writing in the busi-
ness academy and now creeps into other disciplines.”20
The story behind the move toward marijuana’s legality is a story of
disruptive forces—to incumbent markets, to incumbent places, to the
incumbent regulatory structure, and to the legal system in general
which must mediate the battles between the push for relaxation of
illegality and adaptation to a new normal and the push toward en-
trenchment, resilience for the status quo, and resistance to that
disruption.
Although marijuana legalization and the introduction of marijuana-
based land uses into a community is not the type of change that en-
16. See Jon M. Garon, Mortgaging the Meme: Financing and Managing Disruptive
Innovation, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 441, 442 (2012) (the term “disruptive
innovation” has “grown considerably to encompass virtually any incumbent market
threat”).
17. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
175, 175 (2014) (focusing especially on how agencies must be agile and capable of
handling “regulatory disruption”).
18. Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching
the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43, 45 (1995).
19. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xiii (Michael L. Tushman & Andrew
H. Van de Ven eds., 1997); see also, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E.
RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL
GROWTH (2003); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, SCOTT D. ANTHONY & ERIK A. ROTH,
SEEING WHAT’S NEXT: USING THE THEORIES OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY
CHANGE, at xv–xvii (2004); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, JEROME H. GROSSMAN &
JASON HWANG, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR
HEALTH CARE (2009).
20. Cortez, supra note 17, at 177.
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tirely displaces or crowds out incumbent land uses, it does change the
incumbent landscape of allowable land uses, altering what we might
call “the land use industry,” if you will, that exists within any particu-
lar community. Moreover, it at least also separately serves a disruptive
role because marijuana cultivation and sales in a community threaten
displacement of other incumbent, already-legal drug companies (phar-
maceutical, alcohol, tobacco, etc.) that face new competition for their
products and rival for supplying the effects offered by their products.
Furthermore, with marijuana legalization or other relaxation of pot
laws, perhaps the disruption could be termed “legality innovation.”
Consider “relational innovation”—which has been defined as begin-
ning with “a firm’s development of relevance for its [new] product or
service,” and “measured by the consumer’s desire for the firm’s prod-
uct or service.”21 We might borrow from that arrangement of ideas
regarding “relational innovation” and define “legality innovation” as
that which begins with the change in law that leads to the develop-
ment of the lawful relevance of, lawful business regarding, and legal
use for a newly legal product, the successful deployment of which de-
pends on the relative acceptance of the general public which must pro-
vide a venue for its operations along with the relative change in the
consuming public’s attitudes as a result of the introduction of legality.
Focusing just on the consumer angle for a moment, applying Camp-
bell’s analysis of disruption,22 this analogy to what this Article is call-
ing “legality innovation” fits. Campbell posits that the very definition
of “disruptive innovation” applies “[o]nly when the innovation allows
the targeting of new consumers or the targeting of existing consumers
in ways not of interest to the incumbents.”23 Indeed, one of the ways
disruptive innovation works is by creating “new markets, allowing
those who previously were not consumers to become consumers,”
where “[e]xisting customers do not, at least at first, shift to the new
product. Rather, thanks to the disruptive innovation, those without
the option to be consumers at all have a chance to become consumers
for the first time.”24 At other times, or even just with the passage of
time, the disruptive innovation will be of the type that also takes cus-
tomers away from incumbents.25 Marijuana legalization seems to do
both—it offers through “legality innovation” a product previously un-
available to law-abiding consumers, and it threatens over time to act
as a replacement product for those that might otherwise consume al-
cohol, tobacco, or pharmaceutical products.
21. Garon, supra note 16, at 448.
22. Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal
Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2012) (examining how innovation can
change market structures).
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 11–15.
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One somewhat similar area where disruptive innovation is being
studied relates to the impact of new land uses from the sharing econ-
omy. New sharing economy business structures and models have been
studied describing incumbent opposition to new community entrants
and new lands uses, exhibited through zoning and other means, and
the relatively limited opportunities for new disruptors to make their
claim in the process.26
The literature appears to be sparse, if not empty of, the application
of disruption theory to land use. It appears equally thin on identifying
marijuana’s market impact as one with the characteristics shared in
other studies of disruptive innovation. And the concept of “legality
innovation” is similarly absent from current discussions. If we start to
consider the application of each to land use generally and through a
marijuana legalization case study, we can find even more interesting
ways to examine this unique type of disruption. For this Article’s pur-
poses, the disruption theme will run throughout, helping to explain
the regulatory responses and community demands likely to surface
when addressing existing and upcoming land-use questions related to
marijuana-based property uses and assisting with understanding the
interest-group dynamics that are at play.
Whether one supports the preservation of place or alteration of
place, the incumbent occupants of the place will have tremendous in-
fluence on the level of acceptance given to the new disruptive use of
the place. Incumbent members of a place protect their space against
newcomers.27 As Ellickson explains regarding zoning, for example,
“friends of the house come out winners while others are losers” and
“[g]iven the huge amounts at stake, it is not surprising that special
influence problems have plagued zoning from its inception.”28 There
are very special and extensive protections that existing uses and users
get within our property system, including across a variety of land use
doctrines, and such protection makes it difficult to make regulatory
26. Michael N. Widener, Shared Spatial Regulating in Sharing-Economy Districts,
46 SETON HALL L. REV. 111, 175–85 (2015) (positing that when a new sharing pro-
ducer business model requires a change in zoning, outsiders have less voice and in-
cumbent residents will mobilize against it and have more privileged access to the
power to exclude the new use).
27. Cf. Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism: An Intro-
duction, in SPATIALIZING LAW: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LAW IN SO-
CIETY 1, 13–14 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Benda-
Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism] (discussing examples of historical ten-
dencies for some laws to “distinguish between original settlers and newcomers who
are assigned a lower status with less political and economic rights”).
28. Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 701 (1973) (“Zoning is not a
perfectly balanced roulette wheel, randomly bestowing its wins and losses” but in-
stead favors incumbents and those in current control of the power structures where
“[i]n most communities the wheel is warped”).
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changes and set altered land use priorities.29 In light of that fact, the
land-use disruptor has some serious hurdles to overcome the forces
that favor incumbent land uses and prevailing limits on the universe of
acceptable uses.
The next Part examines the legal mechanisms capable of being
deployed to regulate and manage (in either a controlling or encourag-
ing manner) the disruptive effects of marijuana-related land uses—
along with the historical, antecedent legal mechanisms employed in
other areas of law that are likely to serve as models for marijuana-
related land-use regulation.
III. THE LAND USE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
A community will employ land use controls as a means to control or
transform its space and to manage disruptions to it.30 Land-use con-
trols provide mechanisms for satisfying individual or community pref-
erences regarding the use of property. These controls help shape the
landscape and motivate how individuals and the community interact
with property by identifying permissible land uses, acceptable behav-
ior, and the scope of property rights. Oftentimes, limitations will be
imposed on how others use property so as to satisfy those prefer-
ences.31 As such, it is important that anyone involved with pot-related
properties—whether to encourage or oppose them—develops a basic
understanding and capability to navigate the land-use controls and
limitations that will be used to manage the disruption, and that are
acknowledged and enforced by society and the legal system.
29. See generally Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use
Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009) Several others characterize these hurdles
not just as process-based but also due to the controlling “elites” within the land use
and planning system. See, e.g., Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al., The Properties of
Property, in CHANGING PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY 2 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et
al. eds. 2006) [hereinafter Benda-Beckmann et al., Properties of Property] (discussing
the role of “ruling elites” putting energy into “regulating and changing property re-
gimes” to advance and protect their interests); see also Low & Lawrence-Zúñiga,
supra note 8, at 19–20 (contending that urban planning “[t]ypically serve[s] the inter-
ests of political elites and monied interests”).
30. See Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism, supra note 27, at 9
(“Legal constructions of space are used as an instrument to control people and re-
sources. Especially state governments use constructions of space in order to effec-
tively transform their imagined community into a well controlled and bounded
space.”).
31. NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 111
(Michael Dear et. al. eds., Guilford Press 1994) (“Social relations are frequently un-
derstood by human agents with reference to specific places, the boundaries of which
are usually collectively defined.”); see Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of
the Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
441, 496 (2007) (“the land use regulatory system is not a self-contained legal system
that shapes land use, but is instead a medium of various forces in society”).
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We can begin by identifying a few broad categories of such land-use
controls.32 These include: (1) common law limitations on how one can
use her property, principally by recognizing the initial assignments of
rights or sometimes the “foundational” or “inherent” limits that serve
at the base of property law; (2) means of voluntary adjustment to ini-
tial assignments of rights through private consensual agreements; and
(3) public (i.e., “legislative” or “regulatory”) land-use controls which
involve government-imposed rules upon individuals about what they
can and cannot do with their land. These types of public land use con-
trols typically involve involuntary, mandatory rules. The zoning, plan-
ning, permitting, and licensing systems we expect to see employed in
the control of pot-related properties fall in this category.33 Prohibi-
tions on types of use and other mandates or restrictions, of course,
also serve as public land-use control mechanisms.
Public land-use controls are powerful tools to minimize the disrup-
tive influences of unwanted land uses or to privilege welcomed ones.
They are also effective mechanisms for protecting the position of in-
cumbent land uses or to preserve the incumbent community values
reflected in the existing authorized uses of property within a
jurisdiction.
It should be obvious that this public controls category is steeped
deeply in authority and can cast a very extensive net to alter the legal
land-use landscape. The potential for such breadth is firmly planted in
the legal authority the courts grant such regulators, especially regard-
ing the “police power.” State and local governments operate with a
general police power that is extraordinarily wide, giving them broad
authority to regulate for the public health, safety, morals, and public
welfare.34 The U.S. Supreme Court has given this “public welfare”
standard a very broad interpretation. Consider, for example, the
Court’s statement in Berman v. Parker (recently quoted with approval
in the case of Kelo v. City of New London):35
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mon-
etary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present
32. Arnold, supra note 31, at 472–73 (describing various types of land-use con-
trols, particularly detailing examples of a wide spectrum of public land-use control
mechanisms).
33. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 40–55 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing
history of zoning controls, planning, and related rules); see also Arnold, supra note 31,
at 464–65 (discussing land-use planning as a type of public land-use control
mechanism).
34. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592
(1906).
35. 545 U.S. 469, 481 (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-1\TWR102.txt unknown Seq: 10  2-JUN-16 12:23
44 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 3
case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determi-
nations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for
us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sani-
tary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.36
Justifications for governmental intervention into land uses through
legislative and other regulatory powers, therefore, abound.
Extensions and adaptations to combat or accommodate the emer-
gence of pot-related properties are present in the common law (such
as nuisance); private land-use controls (such as servitudes) and other
private-ordering mechanisms (including contracts or even simply so-
cial adjustments); and public lands-use controls (including zoning and
permitting).37 Neighbors and permitting regimes each exercise power
in the land-use system and lend to the regulatory control dynamics
that emerge.38
Most of the conflicts and coordination problems that we see emerg-
ing (or can predict emerging) with marijuana legalization are not
unique to pot-related properties.39 We can learn from the past regula-
tion of similar conflicts associated with precursor industries and other
new property-use introductions into the land use atmosphere—partic-
ularly regulations and neighborhood responses to other “vice”-re-
lated, “sinful,” or otherwise purportedly unseemly land uses. Those
hoping to constrain pot-related property uses can use these past regu-
latory occurrences as a blueprint for imposing costs on pot-related en-
tities and dampening the impact of pot-related properties on the
public space. Examples of uses or business types that have contended
with community opposition and the imposition of stringent land-use
limitations include: liquor stores;40 bars (and concomitant liquor li-
36. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (emphasis added).
37. An exploration of how these categories of regulatory response are intercon-
nected and play off of each other in a dynamic way is explored elsewhere in my work.
See Donald J. Kochan, A Framework for Understanding Property Regulation and
Land Use Control from a Dynamic Perspective, 4 MICH. J. ENVT’L & ADMIN. L. 303
(2015).
38. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 473 (“The land use regulatory system coordi-
nates the exercise of power and development of public policy among various commu-
nities and identities that are formed in relationship to land.”); see, e.g., Nicholas
Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 567, 569 (1998) (“socially
produced space is saturated with power relations.”).
39. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 471–72 (“Decisions about which uses are incom-
patible with one another under various circumstances, as well as choices about how to
segregate these incompatible uses, are [regularly] made within the land use regulatory
system.”).
40. Mikos, supra note 4, at 751 (comparing marijuana land-use regulations to the
history where “[l]ocal communities have long regulated the sale and even possession
of alcoholic beverages . . . [with] a patchwork of dry, damp, and wet communities in
local option states.”); Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 147–51, 156 (discussing the
“broad and deep” zoning authority to restrict the sale of alcohol in buildings and on
certain lands).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\3-1\TWR102.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-JUN-16 12:23
2016] INCUMBENT LANDSCAPES, DISRUPTIVE USES 45
cense supply controls);41 adult entertainment; adult bookstores; porn
shops;42 massage parlors; strip clubs; and other similar “vice-laden” or
“sinful” lifestyle activities.43 Relatedly then, nightclubs, assisted living
homes,44 abortion clinics,45 video arcades,46 and other “disfavored”
activities have also faced obstacles that provide experiences upon
which those wishing to engage in marijuana-related uses or activities
can draw to anticipate opposition and develop strategies. Society has a
long history of using local land use laws to keep out uses that it does
not like.
Undoubtedly, many pot-related properties will face “Not-in-My-
Backyard” (“NIMBY”)-like opposition.47 The secondary effects from
adult entertainment establishments demonstrate the possibilities.
Those effects have long been considered by the courts a legitimate
reason to target restrictive land use regulations at such businesses.48 In
fact, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected certain First Amendment chal-
lenges to some regulations on such adult entertainment businesses be-
cause it found the localities’ purpose in regulating to be the control of
secondary adverse impacts on the neighborhoods.49
In an important survey of marijuana laws across the United States,
particularly as they relate to medical marijuana, Nemeth and Ross ar-
ticulated this strong connectedness between emerging marijuana land-
use restrictions and restrictions adopted in the past to deal with seem-
ingly similar industries—demonstrating that all that is old is new
again:
41. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 145–47 (discussing local government re-
quirements for liquor licenses, often in addition to licensing obtained from the state).
42. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 3 (describing use in marijuana land use
decisions of “distance requirements, similar to those used in the regulation of adult
business uses”).
43. Thomas B. Griffen, Note, Zoning Away the Evils of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1373, 1395–96 (1988) (discussing cases on use of zoning to exclude adult en-
tertainment businesses including porno shops and massage parlors).
44. See, e.g., Michael Kling, Note, Zoned Out: Assisted-Living Facilities and Zon-
ing, 10 ELDER L.J. 187 (2002) (explaining the ways that zoning can work to keep out
or shrink the location options for siting assisted living facilities in light of neighbor-
hood opposition).
45. Griffen, supra note 43, at 1395 (discussing cases on use of zoning to exclude
abortion clinics).
46. Id. at 1396–97 (discussing cases on use of zoning to exclude video arcades
which “[c]ourts generally have upheld” on the basis that “[v]ideo arcades have the
capability of producing nuisance-like adverse impacts on surrounding neighborhoods
such as litter, noise, pedestrian traffic, depreciation of neighboring property values,
and crime[;]” and because “video games are said to be addictive, psychologically
harmful, conducive to gang activity and other anti-social behavior, and are said to
produce adverse effects on morality and frugality.”).
47. Jeremy Nemeth & Eric Ross, Planning for Marijuana: The Cannabis Conun-
drum, J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N, Aug. 2014, at 7 (identifying NIMBY-based opposition to
marijuana land uses).
48. Griffen, supra note 43, at 1396.
49. Id. at 1395–96 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
68–71 (1976)).
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[I]n practice [medical marijuana dispensaries (MMDs)] are regu-
lated most closely to liquor stores and other nuisance/vice uses. To
allocate suitable land for MMDs, communities around the country
are adopting the same zoning restrictions that prohibit any busi-
nesses selling alcohol, pornography, firearms, and fast food from lo-
cating in residential or even mixed-use neighborhoods. For
example, local jurisdictions are applying the same proximity buffers
used to separate sex-oriented businesses from residential areas and
sensitive uses such as schools, parks, and playgrounds. They are also
employing density controls commonly used to control bar and li-
quor store density, most often the spacing between such facilities.50
Furthermore, the past is filled with examples in which people sued
under private and public nuisance laws, for example, to attempt to
shut down or drive out several of these types of unwanted businesses
that had arrived earlier in the public space.51 Most of the successful
cases involved the secondary adverse effects or secondary nuisances
traceable to the liquor store operation, for example.52 Pot-related
properties should expect to see the same types of efforts.53
50. Nemeth & Ross, supra note 47, at 6 (surveying local government marijuana-
related land-use regulations); see also, e.g., Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 4–5
(describing Colorado 1,000-foot distance regulations from previously denied permit
locations or a “school; alcohol or drug abuse treatment facility; principal campus of a
seminary, college, or university; or a child care facility” and more generally surveying
local government distance regulations related to proximity to “churches, drug and
alcohol rehabilitation facilities, group homes, halfway houses, recreational property,
and in some instances, any publicly owned or maintained property” as well as some
requiring dispensaries be “a certain distance from smoke shops, marijuana parapher-
nalia shops, and other dispensing facilities.”).
51. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 172–74 (describing ways to characterize es-
tablishments selling liquor as nuisances per se or nuisance accidents and cases that did
so); Shelley Ross Saxer, License to Sell: Constitutional Protection Against State or Lo-
cal Government Regulation of Liquor Licensing, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 474
(1995) [hereinafter Saxer, License to Sell] (“The sale of intoxicating liquor has been
deemed a common law nuisance by some courts, although many of the decisions in-
volved liquor operations that were illegal.”) (collecting cases).
52. Saxer, License to Sell, supra note 51, at 475 (“The mere location of a lawful
retail liquor store may constitute a nuisance—not because of illegality, but because of
the associated crime problems accompanying such a land use.”); Saxer, Strategies,
supra note 13, at 124 (“Many neighborhood nuisance problems such as graffiti, loiter-
ing, and prostitution, are linked to the sale of alcohol.”).
53. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining that some jurisdictions con-
sider outdoor growing of marijuana a nuisance because of observability as well as
“excess odor, heat, glare, noxious gases, traffic, crime, and other impacts” as well as
“repeat responses . . . by law enforcement personnel to the site, excessive noise, or
any distributive impact created by the cultivation.”); see also Mikos, supra note 4, at
764 (surveying the state laws either authorizing localities to ban retail marijuana sales,
denying local governments that authority, or not yet resolving that issue of authority;
but concluding that “[n]otwithstanding their firm rejection of local authority to ban
marijuana shops, all of these states do allow local authorities to enact some reasona-
ble regulations to govern them”).
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In fact, “hard prohibition” efforts by local governments are already
surfacing in some communities, even in states that have gone so far as
to legalize marijuana for recreational use. Mikos explains:
[S]tates are now facing growing opposition from within their own
borders. Citing concerns over marijuana’s perceived harms, many
local communities in marijuana legalization states are seeking to re-
instate marijuana prohibitions at the local level. Communities in at
least twelve marijuana legalization states have already passed local
bans on marijuana dispensaries. Even in Colorado, arguably the
state with the most liberal marijuana policies, more than 150 munic-
ipalities have passed ordinances banning the commercial sale of
marijuana.54
A number of localities have also enacted moratoria to get their arms
around their regulatory options.55 Some states allow localities broad
discretion to regulate marijuana distribution, including allowing com-
plete bans on opening dispensaries in a locality.56
Moreover, short of prohibition, lawmakers can curtail the accessi-
bility of even legal and recently legalized products, if they so desire,
through zoning or licensing regimes.57 Again, liquor control provides
strong precedent. Zoning and other means of control have been gen-
erally upheld, against legal challenges, to control a variety of aspects
of liquor stores—from location limitations to operational restric-
tions.58 As with liquor, there are a variety of what may be called “soft
prohibition” efforts to limit the effectiveness of marijuana legality in
these states through general regulatory powers. Mikos explains that
“countless other communities that otherwise welcome or at least tol-
erate the marijuana industry are nonetheless attempting to regulate it,
imposing their own idiosyncratic rules concerning the location, size,
hours, signage, security, and goods sold and taxes paid by local ven-
dors.”59 Salkin and Kansler, for example, identify laws in Colorado,
New Mexico, Maine, and Rhode Island as examples where localities
have imposed distance and visibility regulations for grow sites and dis-
pensing facilities as well as additional licensing conditions that require
54. Mikos, supra note 4, at 720.
55. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 3 (describing the number of municipalities
that have enacted moratoria on medical marijuana establishments, explaining that
“[w]henever new and seemingly controversial land uses arrive on the scene, it is not
uncommon for planners and municipal official to enact moratoria to buy some time to
study and develop appropriate regulations”).
56. Grimes & Massey, supra note 1, at 46.
57. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Megan Scanlon, The Legal Anatomy of Product Bans
to Protect the Public’s Health, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 161, 174–75
(2014) (“Although licensing or zoning may not be used to ban products entirely, they
effectively outlaw them from certain zones to curtail the prevalence.”).
58. Griffen, supra note 43, at 1387–88 (discussing cases finding wide authority to
use zoning to control liquor stores).
59. Mikos, supra note 4, at 720.
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extra security measures be taken by such businesses.60 Florida pro-
vides another example of a state-based limit on the total number of
marijuana dispensaries statewide to just five facilities.61 Public land-
use controls to combat or accommodate the emergence of pot-related
properties can certainly include what some call “muscular” zoning,62
(particularly its exclusionary characteristics) where zoning is used to
control for aesthetics or other values rather than just against nuisances
or traditionally defined externalities.63 Zoning is, after all, one of the
main vehicles used as an exclusionary mechanism to shield certain
places (or parts of communities) from certain types of activities.64
Zoning is an influential way that the law works to create “spatial
order.”65
Additional public land-use controls include permitting (conditional
use and special-use permits especially) and licensing regimes.66 Li-
censing (state and local) and other regulation that increases costs, i.e.,
that hampers the effectiveness and profitability of the effort, work to
make the incidence of a particular land use less likely. After all, liquor
store and liquor license control has often been accomplished by condi-
tional use or special-use permitting as a means to provide particular-
ized determinations whether a use will have an adverse impact.67
Other ways to limit the activity (or its success) include signage restric-
tions68 or requirements to have security guards.69 The regulators
might impose limits on hours,70 location, size, adequate lighting, graf-
60. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 4.
61. Grimes & Massey, supra note 1, at 47.
62. See DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 1010–11 (8th ed. 2014) (discussing the
expanding aims of zoning to more “muscular” methods beyond nuisance control).
63. Griffen, supra note 43, at 1392–93 (“Freed from the confines of nuisance the-
ory, the courts rapidly expanded the legitimate objectives of zoning by construing
many novel ordinances . . . . While some judges have objected to this expansion, a
municipality’s power to enact an ordinance in the name of general welfare seems well
settled.”); Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 3–4 (explaining zoning options—and the
importance of clearly defining terms—for controlling marijuana-related land uses).
64. See Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism, supra note 27, at 5
(discussing zoning as a way that “[l]aw is also used for creating spaces for more spe-
cific purposes with special legal regimes that are superimposed on this general geo-
graphical political and administrative grid”).
65. Paul Babie, The Spatial: A Forgotten Dimension of Property, 50 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 323, 330–31 (2013) (“[S]ocial life—society—has a definite spatial form . . . it
arranges space itself by means of buildings, boundaries, paths, markers, zones, and so
on, so that the physical milieu of that society also takes on a definite pattern. In both
senses a society acquires a definite and recognizable [sic] spatial order.”).
66. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 3 (describing use of special use permits for
marijuana facilities).
67. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 158.
68. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 6 (surveying marijuana advertising and
signage restrictions and the corresponding free speech concerns).
69. Id. (explaining security requirements associated with marijuana land-use per-
mits that resemble the same requirements attached to liquor store permits).
70. Id. at 7 (giving examples of opening and closing hour restrictions for marijuana
facilities); Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 160 (describing some of the conditions
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fiti, or litter removal, among other things.71 Hour and day restrictions
on the sale of alcohol are common, for example, and are often justi-
fied by noise, disorderly conduct, religious concerns, or the amount of
traffic on a specific day and the corresponding heightened need to
control against impaired driving.72 Various licensing and permitting
regimes work to marginalize otherwise legal but unwanted busi-
nesses—such as by setting caps on the number of liquor licenses
within a certain radius (thereby both keeping out unwanted activities
and also serving to protect the competitive share of existing busi-
nesses). We can certainly expect (and already see in some cases) that
methods used in liquor store permitting will be applied to marijuana
properties, including: the concentration limits mentioned above where
caps are set on the overall number of liquor licenses within a certain
area73 based on the belief that such limits help to control crime and
blight that is believed will more readily obtain when too many estab-
lishments like liquor stores are in the same vicinity;74 limiting the
manner and location of sale generally;75 and distance or proximity re-
strictions—such as in relation to schools, child care and youth facili-
for liquor store licenses as including agreements to “remove graffiti promptly, provide
adequate lighting, remove trash, provide a security guard, and in some instances, limit
hours of operation,” along with things like advertising limits and spatial proximity
restrictions between stores and between a store and sensitive areas like schools, parks,
churches, and the like).
71. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 7 (Very much like with liquor-based or adult
establishments, in several municipalities “[z]oning ordinances have also imposed a
duty on dispensing facilities to ensure the cleanliness of the neighborhood. Some lo-
calities require dispensing facilities to frequently retrieve litter from around the build-
ing and the surrounding sidewalks. Other ordinances require that graffiti on
dispensary facility walls be removed promptly.”); see also Griffen, supra note 43, at
1375–76 (describing a Los Angeles ordinance as an example that dramatically de-
creased applications to sell liquor by implementing a comprehensive permitting
scheme to combat blight with concentration restrictions, lighting and security require-
ments, hours of operation limits, neighbor notification with public hearings before
permit issuance, proximity limitations (to protect schools, churches, and hospitals),
special planning approvals, and other mechanisms).
72. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 170–71.
73. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing limits on the number of mari-
juana dispensing facilities in an area); Saxer, License to Sell, supra note 51, at 443
(discussing regulatory strategies “that may help combat liquor store overconcentra-
tion” and liquor store density controls through “limits on the number of outlets that
are allowed”); id. (discussing over-concentration of liquor stores and liquor licensing).
74. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 123 (“Recent studies indicate that there is a
‘high correlation between the number of liquor stores and a neighborhood’s crime
rate.’”); Saxer, License to Sell, supra note 51, at 473 (discussing legitimacy of state
interests as measured by loitering, graffiti, and other crime control necessitated by
“having a liquor store in the neighborhood”).
75. Griffen, supra note 43, at 1374 (“Municipalities have taken aim at the vendors
of alcoholic beverages by passing zoning ordinances that limit the number and type of
establishments permitted to sell liquor.”).
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ties, parks and playgrounds, seminaries, colleges and universities,
treatment facilities and jails, and residential areas.76
This Article will not deal with the constitutional limits on what zon-
ing or other regulations can be imposed on marijuana-related land
uses, but it is important to remember that they exist and constrain the
scope of acceptable regulation (especially with restrictions like exclu-
sionary zoning or outright bans) and put limits on societal choices to
preserve or protect a “place.”77 Broadly stated, these limits include:
equal protection (where rational basis review is likely to apply);78 sub-
stantive due process;79 property rights and takings law protections;80
First Amendment, state preemption of local laws, and other similar
constraints. Most often the broad regulatory authority, including
under the police power and through zoning, will not run afoul of con-
stitutional limits.81 Nonetheless, some “[l]egislation has been invali-
dated on the basis that the regulations created arbitrary classifications
that were not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.”82
Lastly, we cannot forget that even apart from public and judicial
land-use controls, private land-use controls—such as restrictive cove-
nants and other servitudes—represent separate, non-governmental
options that were often used to control liquor and other uses on
properties83 and could play an important role in the land-use land-
scape for pot-related properties. Covenants can be attached to leases
76. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 169–70 (examining regulations that control
against “undue concentration” including placing distance limitations on liquor sales).
Borrowing from liquor store regulations, similar distance regulations are emerging for
marijuana-related uses of property. Salkin & Kansler, supra note 4, at 7 (describing
zoning measures being used to control growing and cultivation of marijuana, includ-
ing location, size, distance, visibility, and security restrictions); see also, e.g., Mikos,
supra note 4, at 731–32 (“[T]o varying degrees communities in Colorado and else-
where restrict the number, location, size, and hours of operation of locally permitted
marijuana stores.”).
77. Griffen, supra note 43, at 1377–83 (discussing the typical constitutional chal-
lenges to zoning ordinances).
78. Saxer, License to Sell, supra note 51, at 483 (“Suspect classifications and funda-
mental interests are generally not at issue when regulating liquor licenses and, there-
fore, strict scrutiny of regulatory action is not applied. As a result, most regulations
are upheld under the rational basis test.”).
79. Id. at 489 (“State or local governing authorities may regulate liquor licensing
actions without violating a licensee’s substantive due process rights provided the gov-
ernment’s action is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.”).
80. Id. (Liquor store regulations are not usually a taking because “[m]ost liquor
regulation will likely be deemed to substantially advance legitimate state interests and
the court will probably find that the owner will not be denied economically viable use
of his land.”).
81. Id. at 484.
82. Id.
83. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 176–78 (describing private land use con-
trols, including defeasible estate and restrictive covenants, as mechanisms for control-
ling even otherwise legal alcohol sales establishments).
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or conveyances in fee.84 Some private covenants in leases and fees, or
defeasible fee limitations, might even be enforceable as written to pre-
clude marijuana-based property uses because they use the term “le-
gal,” “lawful use,” or “illegal” and, as discussed earlier, the continuing
illegality under federal law may make those clauses enforceable and
operational. It is important to note that, if one wishes to allow or en-
courage marijuana-related land uses on lands subject to such a clause,
legal instruments may need amending to make the permissibility of
pot-related uses clear.
Individuals wishing to use private land-use restrictions as a control
mechanism could prevent property from being used for pot-related
purposes, which was the case with liquor stores or other such disfa-
vored land uses.85 Furthermore, old restrictions could be renegotiated
to make terms more specific and certain (like defining “unlawful” ac-
cording to federal law). Contracts and adjustments to non-legal social
institutions could also have a role in determining the level of accepta-
bility of marijuana into the land-use landscape (no smoking policies in
restaurants or in the workplace properties, for example).
There are also many ways that community activism efforts have
been successful at pressuring liquor stores to change their practices or
voluntarily work to limit the secondary nuisances that occur as a result
of their operations.86 Similarly, some efforts have successfully delayed
the opening of, or “boycott-out-of existence,” liquor store opera-
tions.87 Undoubtedly, pot-related properties will face social and politi-
cal pressure that will exist both inside and as a complement to the
creation of the legal landscape to determine the level of acceptability
or exclusion of marijuana from society and the lands it uses and
controls.
Put simply, even entirely legal enterprises can sometimes face pri-
vate protests and lawsuits, regulatory hurdles, and public land-use
controls that can severely hamper the effectiveness and profitability of
the effort. Certainly, legality innovations (i.e., newly legal products
and businesses) become fertile ground for disputes over differences
between formal legality and soft prohibition. In the face of opposition
and despite sometimes substantial legal hurdles, some of the older ac-
tivities once (and perhaps still) deemed less desirable have nonethe-
less worked around the property law-related obstacles to maintain
their businesses. Even if legally disabled through these types of prop-
erty-related regulatory blows, pot might similarly adapt. At the same
84. Id. at 177–78 (“Restrictive covenants have also been used historically to pre-
vent liquor sales on particular parcels of property. These covenants have been found
in the forms of both leasehold conveyances and conveyances in fee simple.”).
85. Id. at 190 (discussing that “the use of restrictive covenants, either in the con-
veyance of a fee or of a leasehold, may be somewhat more effective in restricting
liquor sales on certain property.”).
86. Id. at 180–81, 190.
87. Id. at 181–82.
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time, opposition forces have learned how to marginalize some un-
wanted uses and will no doubt borrow from the past, too.
The analogies presented in this Part to similarly-situated or simi-
larly-opposed property uses are helpful to study if one wishes to antic-
ipate and navigate the conflicts, questions, and solutions that will
surface in response to pot-related property uses. These uses are intro-
duced as a disruptive force into the existing legal landscape and as
legality innovation threatens incumbent land policy. While the focus
of this Part has been on property law implications of new pot-related
entrants into property ownership and usage, also instructive are a se-
ries of interest-group realities that should help one understand and
cautiously approach an evaluation of regulatory battles surrounding
pot-related properties.
IV. PERMITS AND POWER, BAPTISTS AND BOOTLEGGERS
The structure of the land-use regulatory system ultimately forms af-
ter juggling the concerns of a variety of interest groups, and thereafter
mediating the conflict between incumbent users and disruptive new
users of the legal and physical landscapes. As Arnold counsels, the
task of “[m]ediating the relationships between these communities and
types of power is one of the core functions of the land use regulatory
system,” and a prototypical example of when such a mediating func-
tion becomes necessary is seen when addressing “a conflict between
developers who seek to create value for themselves from new devel-
opment, and neighbors who seek to stop or constrain new develop-
ment in order to protect their existing quality of life and property
values.”88 Most of the mechanisms used in liquor-store regulations
and similar controls discussed in the previous Part—and already
emerging in the marijuana-control landscape as well—are examples of
the battle over the imposition of controls to minimize the footprint of
the emergent land uses and their concurrent landscape disruption.
Thus, predictions can be made regarding the likely areas where in-
terest group battles will be salient in a post-decriminalization or post-
legalization era, such as zoning, city planning, competition for the
scarce resource of liquor or pot licenses attached to properties when
fighting within a common but fixed pool, and the like. Interest groups
on every side are in the market for marijuana-related legislation and
other legal outcomes (including most specifically property-related
laws) to constrain or to propel the new industry and its new legality.
The move toward acceptance of pot-related properties within commu-
nities (and marijuana decriminalization or legalization itself) is also an
interest group-laden enterprise within the competitive marketplace
for legal favor.
88. Arnold, supra note 31, at 474–75.
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The role of competing interests—and their impact on the possible
or probable—is often under-recognized in land-use planning de-
bates.89 As one planner describes, “land use and environmental issues
can be contentious to the extreme . . . we often witness multiple local
networks, representing divergent political and ideological perspectives
and working at cross-purposes.”90 One must recognize the presence of
interest groups and their relative positions in the system91 in order to
understand how land-use regulations emerge and determine whether
they serve the public or are simply the product of interest-group
manipulation.
This Part focuses on one manifestation of the political reality ex-
posed by interest-group theory—Baptist and bootlegger “coalitions.”
Accordingly, the following begins with an explanation of the theory
and some representative empirical examples of the lobbying it reveals
and concludes with evidence that such couplings are already present
and at play in the debates on the formulation of legal rules surround-
ing the relaxation of our marijuana laws.
Drawing substantially on the well-developed general interest-group
theory literature,92 one can identify some of the odd interest-group
coalitions that will remain prevalent in marijuana decriminalization or
legalization generally, and in pot-related land-use regulation specifi-
cally. The “bootleggers and Baptists” understanding of interest-group
coalition building was conceived in a 1983 article by Bruce Yandle
where he explained the forces behind the generation of “Blue laws”
that required the Sunday closure of liquor stores in Southern states.93
The Baptists supported these closing laws as a way of combatting sin-
ful behavior and promoting moral and religious values.94 The bootleg-
gers had profit rather than the pulpit in mind, supporting the very
89. ROBERT J. MASON, COLLABORATIVE LAND USE MANAGEMENT: THE QUI-
ETER REVOLUTION IN PLACE-BASED PLANNING 48 (2008) (“Conflict does not go un-
recognized by place-based planning’s proponents, but it is frequently under-
recognized.”).
90. Id.
91. Arnold, supra note 31, at 484 (discussing “the complex and varied array of
forces and influences that the land use regulatory system must mediate as society
makes choices”).
92. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing
How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 222 (2005) (“‘Bootleggers and Bap-
tists’ regulation theory explains how successful lobbying efforts often result when one
supporting group, the ‘Baptists,’ takes the moral high ground while the other group,
the ‘bootleggers,’ seeking to gain competitive advantage, provide political re-
sources.”); see also Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 583, 608–09 (2008) (discussing generally the Baptist and bootlegger
theory in relation to environmental law); see also Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Po-
litical Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315,
316–17 (2002) (explaining the Baptist and bootleggers phenomenon).
93. For the original work describing the Baptist and bootlegger phenomenon, see
Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists–The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7
REG. 12 (May/June 1983).
94. See id.
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same laws because consumers of alcohol would have to seek out the
illegal source if the legal sources were closed for the day.95 These
groups joined forces in support of full alcohol prohibition for the same
divergent reasons. Bootleggers sought a monopoly in the black mar-
ket for liquor while the Baptists seemingly thought the ban on alcohol
sales and consumption altogether would raise the character and virtue
of the citizenry.96 Yandle posits that these groups needed each other
to succeed in obtaining the Sunday-closing laws and Prohibition.
Neither could have obtained those outcomes alone, but their com-
bined efforts were enough regardless of the deviations in their motives
for obtaining these anti-liquor laws.97 The presence of the Baptists in
the legislative fights provided the requisite cover for the bootleggers’
rent-seeking efforts in the legislature to obtain a competitive advan-
tage over legal suppliers.
After the original Yandle article, many have applied the collective
terms, “Baptists” and “bootleggers,” to a slew of other seemingly un-
likely coalitions (a.k.a., “unholy alliances” or “strange bedfellows”),
with the “Baptist” label attaching to the group with the purportedly
public-spirited and morally defensible position, and the “bootlegger”
label attaching to the interest group concurrently seeking self-inter-
ested financial gain and a wealth transfer from the same legislation.98
The public is more likely to be persuaded that legislation—or the
resistance to a legislative change—is acceptable and worth supporting
if such action is supported by a group that appears externally to have
the public interest in mind (“the Baptists”).99 Or, the presence of such
a group at least sufficiently masks the true nature of the legislative
position.100 This masking effect makes it too expensive for others to
obtain enough information and discover the special interest benefi-
ciaries of the legislation. Thus, the masking effect of the one group
partially immunizes the special interest beneficiaries from scrutiny
due to rational ignorance.101 The Baptists will look the other way as to
95. See id.
96. See id. at 13–14.
97. See id.
98. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myth, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
326, 345 n.58 (2009).
99. Id.; see also Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global
Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188 (2002) (“[T]he push for any given
regulation will not be successful if at least two quite different interest groups are
working in the same direction—‘bootleggers’ and ‘Baptists.’”).
100. Morriss, Yandle, & Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, supra note 92, at 222
(“The ‘Bootleggers and Baptists’ theory . . . explains how some people might perceive
the public interest model of regulation as still valid.”).
101. Andrew P. Morriss & Benjamin D. Cramer, Disestablishing Environmental-
ism, 39 ENVTL. L. 309, 356 (2009) (discussing how the Baptists provide “‘theological’
cover for what would otherwise be naked rent-seeking”); Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim
Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 242–43 (2005) (“The ‘Boot-
leggers’ need a public interest face to make their reforms seem more popular, and the
‘Baptists’ need a group with a significant personal stake in the outcome to relentlessly
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the bootleggers’ motives and remain willfully blind to the possible im-
moral acts that the bootleggers might perpetrate, because they know
that without bootlegger funding in the legislative effort, the effort is
less likely to succeed.102 These coalitions allow for the “exploitation of
moral- or social-cost arguments for private economic (or political)
gains.”103 Political observers have identified numerous examples of
such coalitions, including: environmental groups with green agendas
that provide cover stories masking their myriad private financial inter-
ests;104 coordination between energy security and environmental ad-
vocates for ethanol subsidies;105 labor leaders protecting their job pool
by teaming with rights activists against child labor laws;106 plaintiffs’
attorneys seeking fee opportunities coupled with health care agencies
and social welfare advocates in promoting tobacco regulation;107 and
environmentalists seeking to combat the effects of climate change
paired with “companies, industries, and countries” that stand to gain
from a tax imposed on their competitors through climate change
regulation.108
So too do we see “Baptist-and-bootlegger” scenarios emerging in
pot-related legislative battles. When opposing something like mari-
juana legalization, for example, the “Baptists” in the equation fear a
disruption to their incumbent-dominant value position while the
“bootleggers” fear a disruption to their incumbent market position.
One Baptist-bootlegger alliance exists between those with moral or
virtue-based opposition to pot-related properties (the “Baptists”)
teaming up with those who benefit from selling illegal or criminal ma-
rijuana (the “bootleggers”) to oppose legalization or permissions for
the use of legally-recognized and acceptable pot-related properties.
Similarly, they would want to impose stronger “soft prohibition”-like
regulations on property uses to marginalize their competitors. That
finance or otherwise help to push through the legislation.”); see also Yandle & Buck,
supra note 99, at 190 (discussing the “cover story” the Baptist interest can provide).
102. Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public
Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2620–21 (1994) (book review) (“Although there is no
necessary reason why legislators may not take principles into account when fashioning
legislation, experience supported by pubic choice theory suggests that they will often
give them short shrift.”).
103. M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1533
(2009).
104. See generally, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 92.
105. Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol: Law, Economics, and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 434, 463 (2008); Morriss & Cramer, supra note 101, at 356–57 (“[E]thanol’s self-
interested proponents have successfully hijacked the rhetoric of Environmentalism in
their pursuit of government support, as have myriad other ‘green energy’ interests.”).
106. Henderson, supra note 103, at 1533 (providing child labor laws in England and
tobacco legislation in the United States as examples with Baptist and bootlegger
coalitions).
107. Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco
by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225 (2008).
108. Yandle & Buck, supra note 99, at 190.
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coalition has direct lines of analogy to the original use of the Baptist-
bootlegger framing by Yandle to describe the forces favoring prohibi-
tion of alcohol.
There is another alliance that shares characteristics with Baptist-
bootlegger coalition. This second alliance (also under-covered as a
phenomenon in the law review literature on marijuana) involves those
with moral or virtue-based opposition (again, the “Baptists”) teaming
up with the industries that supply legal alternatives to marijuana, par-
ticularly alcohol-related businesses, pharmaceutical companies, and to
some extent tobacco-related operations. They see marijuana as a po-
tential product consumers will substitute for the products the incum-
bents provide. Each of these legal incumbent industries, just like
bootleggers or illegal drug dealers, does not want to lose business to
the new startup, disruptive industries associated with legal or
decriminalized marijuana. These alternative, legal merchants of vice
often see themselves as competing with marijuana operations for the
same revenue pool from the same consumer base seeking somewhat
fungible products.
Others also recognize this second alliance phenomenon’s presence
in pot-related issues (although I have not yet seen it discussed in any
detail from an academic standpoint and no analysis has focused specif-
ically on how marijuana-related land-use law will be implicated by
such coalitions). In a July 2014 story in The Nation, journalist Lee
Fang reported on his investigation of the money flowing into the lob-
bying efforts against legalized marijuana for medicinal and recrea-
tional purposes.109 His reporting reveals what the “Baptists-and-
bootleggers” theory would predict. For example, he found that the
Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America (“CADCA”) “and the
other groups leading the fight against relaxing marijuana laws, includ-
ing the Partnership for Drug-Free Kids (formerly the Partnership for a
Drug-Free America), derive a significant portion of their budget [sic])
from opioid manufacturers and other pharmaceutical companies.”110
Fang explained that, in addition to money contributions to campaigns
against marijuana legalization, lobbyists backed by pharmaceutical
companies have a record of attacking medical marijuana and claiming
risks of abuse while refusing to lobby for pill reform and legislative
efforts to attack painkiller addictions.111 In addition to the influx of a
109. Lee Fang, The Real Reason Pot is Still Illegal, NATION (July 2, 2014), http://
www.thenation.com/article/anti-pot-lobbys-big-bankroll/ (“A close look at the
broader political coalition lobbying against marijuana-law reform reveals many such
conflicts of interest.”).
110. Id.; see also Bob Goethe, Opinion, Yes on 2, and Here’s Why, CITRUS COUNTY
CHRON., (Fla.), Oct. 5, 2014, 2014 WLNR 27695800 (op-ed by doctor claiming that
“[p]harmaceutical companies don’t want any competition from a nonpatentable drug”
like marijuana and “[p]hysicians are not fond of losing the power of the prescription
pad to a natural remedy and are also influenced by the pharmaceutical companies”).
111. Fang, supra note 109.
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new disruptive legal-competitor product, pharmaceutical companies
also worry that physicians will be less fearful of prescribing mari-
juana—to the detriment of substitute pharmaceuticals—if the stigma
and ethical cloud over marijuana-related treatments are lifted.
In addition to pharmaceutical companies, Fang also identified a
number of other groups that directly lobbied, or funded lobbying cam-
paigns, against marijuana legalization to protect their own incumbent,
privileged positions and wealth-based interests against competition or
loss of revenue.112 These groups included: liquor and beer companies
who fear competition; drug treatment centers that rely on court-or-
dered rehabilitation; companies that conduct and benefit from work-
place drug testing that might not be required if marijuana were
legalized; and police who benefit from seized property and cash from
drug busts and also receive large federal grants for drug enforcement
that supplement their budgets.113
The third “bootlegger-and-Baptist” story that one can tell in the
marijuana political debate pits advocates for full legalization of mari-
juana (including for recreational use) against those who have secured
or are seeking to secure a quasi-monopoly on the legal sale of mari-
juana by limiting such sale to medical use—the consequence of defeat-
ing more broad legalization. Whether to maintain their monopoly or
to protect their more sympathetic story and the gains achieved by lim-
ited approval of pot uses, the medical-marijuana lobby has reasons to
oppose outright legalization of marijuana as well.114 For example,
Matthew Yglesias’ report in 2012, described money donations used to
fight the Washington marijuana legalization.115 His sources revealed
that the funding and efforts against legalization were dominated by
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting several state and federal legislators and police officials who verify
the financial interests the police have in maintaining budget sources that flow from
illegal marijuana); see also Philip Ross, Marijuana Legalization: Pharmaceuticals, Al-
cohol Industry Among Biggest Opponents of Legal Weed, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 6,
2014, 5:54 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-legalization-pharmaceuticals-alco-
hol-industry-among-biggest-opponents-legal-weed-1651166; see also Ben Cohen,
Who’s Really Fighting Legal Weed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 8, 2014, 8:00
AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/12/08/pot-legalization-opponents-
aim-to-protect-their-bottom-line (“Crusaders against weed constitute a long list of
suspiciously self-interested folks” like police departments interested in maintaining
sources of revenue from forfeiture, alcohol and beer interests who “fear the competi-
tion,” and pharmaceutical companies who want pain customers to prefer their prod-
ucts to marijuana).
114. See, e.g., Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Newsom Losing Appetite for Healthy-
Food Laws, S.F. GATE (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/
article/Newsom-losing-appetite-for-healthy-food-laws-3173210.php (“[T]he California
Cannabis Association – which represents a group of Sacramento medical marijuana
dispensaries – came out against legalization as well, fearing it may allow conservative
towns to ban medicinal pot.”).
115. Matthew Yglesias, Baptists and Bootleggers: Medical Marijuana Versus Legal
Marijuana, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Nov. 27, 2012, 3:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
moneybox/2012/11/27/marijuana_baptists_and_bootleggers.html.
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the existing medical marijuana industry, a “brand-new interest group
to join the alcohol lobby in opposing legal pot.”116
These “Baptist-and-bootlegger” stories should at least make us cau-
tious about whether new regulations emerging to control legal mari-
juana and associated land uses are actually public-spirited and
advance public welfare. Regardless of whether one wishes to constrain
or promote the new legality innovation represented in marijuana land
uses, the substance of the law can be better shaped if exposure of self-
serving interests opens one’s eyes to a fresh and more objective ap-
proach to such regulations. Who has influence and how he or she in-
fluences the laws becomes particularly important because decisions on
land-use regulation undoubtedly define the place and space within
which we live. The last Part of this Article examines what we have
learned about the meanings that attach to “place” and “space” across
disciplines and the power those concepts have in shaping the law. It
will use these concepts to illustrate the dynamics and interests in the
background of any land use regulatory response to the disruptive in-
novation of marijuana-related land uses.
V. LAND USE REGULATION AND THE CREATION, PRESERVATION,
AND ALTERATION OF PLACE AND SPACE
As we contemplate the use of land-use controls and the interest-
group dynamics—particularly the competitive value and competitive
profit positions of certain segments of the population wishing to main-
tain their comparative advantage of incumbency—another body of
literature on the importance of “place” and “space” is also instructive
to appreciate the full texture of the incumbent societal and geo-legal
landscape as it encounters disruptive forces. One should consider the
legality innovation of marijuana-related land uses as a means of po-
tentially disrupting place and space, i.e., effecting disruption of the
incumbent legal and physical landscape of a community. While the
previous Parts of this Article discussed land-use mechanisms for pre-
serving, altering, or creating a place and some of the politics involved
when marijuana legalization is introduced into the incumbent land-
scape, this closing Part focuses on just how consequential some of our
choices may be. By place, we might mean the physical space, balances
within the community, civic identity, moral communal identity, local
culture, or a similar formulation. Saying that tolerance of pot-related
activities can change a place is not a controversial claim. Any intro-
duction of a newly legal product or business into the legal and com-
munity ecosystem necessarily effects change, for good or bad.117
116. Id.
117. For an examination of the land use control system as a “legal ecosystem,” see
Kochan, supra note 37, at 314 (providing analogies to other work explaining how the
law works like an ecosystem, citing, for example, J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using
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To understand some of these consequences, we can draw on a sub-
stantial and growing body of literature that identifies the importance
of understanding the “place-based” and spatial concerns associated
with property problems.118 As one evaluates the introduction of mari-
juana-related uses as lawful land uses in the legal and physical land-
scape, one must situate pot-property concerns with place and space
understandings. Blomley proposes that, “given the apparent signifi-
cance of space to social relations, it is appropriate that sociolegal
scholars interested in property consider its geographies. The concept
of landscape offers one means of doing so, given that it alerts us to
both the discursive and practical qualities of property.”119 Property
law should engage with this diverse and interdisciplinary literature on
“place-based” and spatial concerns associated with land-use ques-
tions,120 including work developed and emerging in fields like geogra-
phy, sociology, anthropology, ecology, economics, law, and other
fields to position pot-related property issues and the communities
within which they will surface inside this broader mode of analysis.121
The connections between land-use control and this literature are
observed by Taylor, who explains that “the law engages with and artic-
ulates spatial concerns where governments establish, reinforce or im-
pose conditions on the ownership of land” including by “defining
rights of access to and provision for private and public domains.”122
Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996)).
118. See, e.g., Blomley, supra note 38, at 569 (discussing “the saliency of the ‘spatial
turn’ within much social theory”); see also Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal
Pluralism, supra note 27, at 1 (“Since the spatial turn in the social sciences, impressive
advances have been made in analyzing the interrelations between social organization
and processes and space, place and boundaries.”); see also Low & Lawrence-Zúñiga,
supra note 8, at 17 (describing the re-emergence of social science research focused on
“space and place” in the 1990s).
119. Blomley, supra note 38, at 582; see also William Taylor, Introduction: Land-
scape, Identity and Regulation, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY
AND REGULATION 3 (William Taylor ed., 2006) (“geography and landscape . . . eluci-
date the fluidity of human identity—what is commonly called its ‘construction’
through various means . . . [that] situate, locate or position individuals, to cite further
geographic terms, as subjects that use space in some way”).
120. Blomley, supra note 38, at 582.
121. Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism, supra note 27, at 1 (“In
recent years . . . the relationship between law and space has drawn broader interest.”);
see also BLOMLEY, supra note 31, at 146 (spatiality has been under-analyzed in the
past); As one scholar has explained, just as property is influenced by these other disci-
plines, so too does property influence those fields: “[P]roperty regimes and property
rights . . . have also become central to many other disciplines including sociology,
anthropology, political sciences, economics, geography and human ecology. Property
figures as a prime mover in such diverse topics as social evolution, modernization,
globalization, human rights, civil society, and sustainable resource management.”
Benda-Beckmann et al., Properties of Property, supra note 29, at 2 (although within
an analysis largely critical of Western property values).
122. Taylor, supra note 119, at 9; see also Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal
Pluralism, supra note 27, at 3 (“All social and legal institutions, relations and practices
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Above, Part III discusses some of the leading mechanisms available to
governments to do so.
Blomley describes an important assumption in critical geography
literature that “law itself is not simply imposed upon a local setting,
but is instead interpreted in and through that setting.”123 Therefore,
he continues, “[l]aw is . . . produced in such spaces; those spaces, in
turn, are partly constituted by legal norms. Either way, law cannot be
detached from the particular places in which it acquires meaning and
saliency.”124 Land-use controls and other laws affect space and place
as much as space and place affect law, making these reciprocal and
interdependent spheres of influence.
To use marijuana-related properties as our example, there are two
key categories in which to consider these insights—existing space and
altered space.125 The existing spaces and places where pot-related
properties are proposed will affect the size of the universe of accept-
able pot-related uses of property.126 The capacity and willingness to
accept disruption will affect the extent to which alteration of the space
is also possible.
Choices society makes about which property uses, including pot-re-
lated ones, are acceptable—especially when they are disruptive in na-
ture—will undoubtedly impact the nature of the place and space and
require alteration and adaptation of existing laws and regulatory posi-
tions.127 All of the choices explained in the previous Parts and the
relative influence we allow certain groups to wield thus have real con-
sequences on place-based understanding.128 Arnold explains that “the
are located and distributed in space . . . . It involves taking account of the ways places
are carved out, and people, relationships and objects are located and bounded in
space.”).
123. BLOMLEY, supra note 31, at 46.
124. Id.; see also, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1858 (1994) (explaining that
“[z]oning and covenanting prescribe who can occupy certain spaces” and that these
create “the political geography of space” or a “spatial differentiation” that is “the
product of collective action structured by law”).
125. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 471–72 (discussing the use of land-use laws for
“both protecting existing uses and features of these areas and shaping future uses and
features of these areas”).
126. BLOMLEY, supra note 31, at 54 (“Legal categories are used to construct and
differentiate material spaces which, in turn, acquire a legal potency that has a direct
bearing on those using and traversing such spaces.”).
127. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 31, at 463–64 (Land-use “decisions . . . depend on
the ethical choices or frameworks in the communities making those decisions. Land is
a means of defining community, and therefore land becomes infused with community
meanings.”); see also Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism, supra note
27, at 2–3 (“The notion of space provides an important lens through which to view
law. This is because it provides both a grounded, physical setting, as well as a more
intangible universe, in which to locate the varying ways in which social relationships
are created and regulated with differing effects.”).
128. Arnold, supra note 31, at 466 (“Many components and processes of the land
use regulatory system aid local communities in defining, reshaping, and protecting
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land use regulatory system aims to facilitate deliberations and deci-
sions about what an ideal society looks like, situated geographi-
cally.”129 Babie similarly counsels that “[p]roperty theorists might also
tell us that the content of property [is] constituted by the social rela-
tions that exist between others and me and that may or may not be
recognized and enforced by law.”130 Constructing those social and
spatial relations is one of the first tasks in adapting to the presence of
new subjects of legality on the legal landscape and reacting to new
forms of lawful behavior.
In this socio-legal and geo-legal understanding, the existing space
and place where pot-related properties are proposed and the flexibil-
ity of the community to adapt away from the incumbent landscape will
affect the size of the universe of permissible pot-related uses of prop-
erty.131 Babie, for example, describes “two modes of linking spatiality
and law” as involving making determinations on “how spatiality—the
physical and the social space—shapes or influences law and legal de-
velopment, such as property,”132 as well as determining “how law
shapes social space, ‘legal understandings and knowledge of law are
applied to help in understanding the social production of space, how
social spatiality is constructed and organized and expressed.’”133
Any and all land-use decisions—including adding an entirely new
category of legal or acceptable land uses—will affect the character of
a place and configuration of the spatial landscape.134 Even without
making any normative claims about whether such changes are good or
bad, any positive analysis can be used to predict that the invasion of
places within those communities.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the
Issue of Freedom, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991 309, 310 (1993)
(“One of the functions of property rules . . . is to provide a basis for determining who
is allowed to be where . . . . The rules of property give us a way of determining, in the
case of each place, who is allowed to be in that place and who is not.”).
129. Arnold, supra note 31, at 462.
130. Babie, supra note 65, at 324–25.
131. See, e.g., Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism, supra note 27, at
3 (“law is a crucial way of constructing, organizing and legitimating spaces, places, and
boundaries”); see also Erika Fontanez Torres, Law, Extralegality, and Space: Legal
Pluralism and Landscape From Colombia to Puerto Rico, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 285, 287–88 (2009) (“Norms play a key role in our concept of material space
because they are a means of determining property categories, urban planning laws,
and zoning regulations. Property categories are probably the most direct way of con-
figuring space. Property norms determine limits and borders of exclusion by creating
categories such as owner and trespasser.”).
132. Babie, supra note 65, at 333.
133. Id. at 333–34; see also Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism,
supra note 27, at 3, 22 (“law represents an arena in which the politics of space is
enacted and negotiated, one that requires an understanding of the extent to which
legal spaces are embedded in broader social and political claims”).
134. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 131, at 287–88 (2009).
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new species of property uses will disrupt the overall usage landscape
and the legal ecosystem surrounding our treatment of property.135
Normative concerns are likely to be raised that will fuel those argu-
ments generated by opposition forces that might be injected into the
property and land-use law debates. Community exclusion can take
many forms and affect many subjects of activity. For example, some
communities have responded to political pressures to restrict certain
types of occupancy in their space, as recently seen in relation to sex
offender residency restrictions.136 Many other examples were previ-
ously discussed, including the moral and virtue-based claims about
disrupting local fabrics of the community,137 the need to control the
number of vice-related outlets to contain crime and abuse,138 or the
adverse secondary effects139 from allowing the newest permutation of
vice-related industry to enter into a community (the same as seen with
past disputes over, for example, adult bookstores, strip clubs, and li-
quor stores).140 We can anticipate substantial changes in light of these
pre-existing “socially contingent boundaries” of the places where pot-
related properties might wish to emerge.141
But this place-based analysis can also articulate what some of the
normative claims are likely to be about the improvement of place and
135. Taylor, supra note 119, at 4 (“There is in the built environment . . . nothing
that is changeless, only change itself” so studying the social context of it reveals much
about “changing values.”).
136. See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protection-
ism, Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397 (2009); In re Taylor, 343 P.3d
867 (Cal. 2015).
137. Arnold, supra note 31, at 467 (“Zoning and regulatory permitting require-
ments and decisions also reflect and implement local community choices and values
about desired and undesired places.”).
138. Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 125–26 (“[O]verabundance of liquor stores
and the attendant problems such as loitering, littering, graffiti, and prostitution, as
well as the visual impact of alcohol abuse on inner city children, are valid land use
issues . . .” because “it is the exercise of police power directed at those activities
contributing to social blight in the area.”).
139. Nemeth & Ross, supra note 47, at 8 (identifying “feared secondary impacts” as
a justification for many restrictions on marijuana land uses, “especially crime, under-
age use, or diversion to the ‘black market’”). Zoning is seen, for example, as one
mechanism to control against crime rates and for preventing secondary impacts.
James M. Anderson et al., Reducing Crime by Shaping the Built Environment with
Zoning: An Empirical Study of Los Angeles, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 752–53 (2013)
(reporting statistical results showing that “zoning is substantially associated with
crime rates,” meaning that choices in zoning can affect crime rates and those facts
should be considered when making planning decisions).
140. See, e.g., Griffen, supra note 43, at 1391–93 (discussing the evolution of zoning
laws across the years including as applied to controlling vice and advancing virtue).
141. Babie, supra note 65, at 348 (“[W]hat property actually is for a society and
how it helps one make sense of the world depends upon an understanding of social
context, which engenders a sense of community and the bringing together of various
communities or subgroups in relation to scarce resources within a web of socially
contingent boundaries.”); Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism, supra
note 27, at 9 (discussing social anthropology’s quest to understand the “notion of
community”).
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space as a result of more pot-related properties. Arguments might be
made from the side favoring greater inclusiveness of uses, including
focusing on the benefits from new capital injection into the commu-
nity, employment opportunities, the market and tax-based benefits
that might come from allowing properties to be used and developed in
pot-related ways, the benefits from moving activities “above-ground”
and eliminating the negative effects of “underground” or street-based
criminal activities, and so on.142
This Article makes no hard judgments on which place-based argu-
ments are normatively superior. Instead, the focus remains on under-
scoring that these types of place-based concerns are inevitable143 and
must be confronted whenever a jurisdiction makes a choice to move
toward the legalization, decriminalization, or some other relaxation of
its laws against marijuana.144 Along the way, choices will necessarily
be made within existing property law structures and through the invo-
cation of property law vehicles for disputes.
In summary, the character and identity of the places one inhabits
are in part defined by (or at least affected by) the property rules pre-
sent and applicable to the place;145 and decisions regarding property
rules often are colored by the community’s idea of the places it wants
142. Mikos, supra note 4, at 732–33 (“Communities that allow marijuana stores also
see an upside to them. The stores provide medicine for seriously-ill patients, recrea-
tion for consenting adults, tax revenues for cash-strapped local governments, or jobs
for local workers.”); Saxer, Strategies, supra note 13, at 183 (discussing claimed bene-
fits of liquor store presence in a community, including “efforts to expand business
which provides jobs and revenues in areas that desperately need them” where
“[l]iquor stores are operated in neighborhoods that other businesses have shunned,
and such outlets contribute to the local community by hiring residents, sponsoring
community events and contributing tax revenue”).
143. GENE BUNNELL, MAKING PLACES SPECIAL 31 (2002) (“It is impossible to en-
gage in planning without making value judgments concerning the relative desirability
or undesirability of possible future outcomes.”); see also Arnold, supra note 31, at 464
(“[L]and use planning—a significant component of the land use regulatory system—
creates, enhances, and protects a ‘sense of place.’”).
144. Taylor, supra note 119, at 5 (discussing a prominent “assumption that space
and law carry moral worth and elicit moral considerations, however variable their
value might be”); Blomley, supra note 38, at 581–82 (“[R]ecent scholarship in geogra-
phy would suggest that . . . [a] place is not inert but produced.”).
145. Babie explains:
Legal theorists tell us that property is constituted by a set of rights, use privi-
leges and control powers, entitlements, or any one of dozens of ways of
describing what property is. Property theorists might also tell us that those
rights, or however they describe the content of property, are constituted by
the social relations that exist between others and me and that may or may
not be recognized and enforced by law.
Babie, supra note 65, at 324–25; see also David Delaney, Richard T. Ford, & Nicholas
Blomley, Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER xvi
(Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001) (“What has been called the spatiality of social life
is an aspect of social reality that is enormously complex and dynamic, fluid and
shifting.”).
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to preserve,146 alter, or create (i.e., “actively produce”).147 When dis-
cussing the pervasiveness of “the space in which property exists, oper-
ates, and has meaning in people’s lives,” Babie contends that “[a]t
every moment of life, we are interacting with others and the world
around us through some form of property—private, common, or pub-
lic.”148 How the law decides to treat pot-related properties will de-
pend on where those activities are situated and the places they seek to
infiltrate; and the extent to which we wish to alter property laws to
accommodate pot-related properties will in part be tempered by our
tolerance for changing the character and identity of certain places.149
Babie explains this reciprocal relationship between space and law, and
that “social space . . . influences and is influenced by property.”150
Similarly, Blomley advises, “place, like space, is actively constructed
through a constellation of material and discursive practices,” thus “we
should think of places not as static entities but, like landscape, as in a
constant process of becoming . . . [and] a site for political struggle.”151
There is no doubt that players and powers in these pot-affected places
will permeate pot politics and associated pot-related property law de-
bates; and that landscape will shift in some way during the contest
between multiple competing interests.152
Conflicts between land users, neighbors, permitting authorities,
competitors, and others is inevitable—as it always has been with the
introduction of uses that shake up the status quo balance in a place,
requiring coordination of the shared spaces we call communities.153
146. BUNNELL, supra note 143, at 52 (discussing land-use planning as “a means of
achieving and preserving the qualities and features we value in our communities”).
147. Delaney et al., supra note 145, at xvi (“Many geographers and others have
sought to grasp some of the dynamics of social space through reliance on the view that
sees space not as simply being but as having been actively produced.”).
148. Babie, supra note 65, at 325–26 (Explaining we are also relating to “the space
in which . . . the social relationships that constitute property exist; the space where
rights and relationships structure our lives; and the space that we structure through
those rights and relationships.”).
149. Richard Blythe, The Idea of the Town: The Structuring of City Space in a Nine-
teenth Century Colonial Town, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY
AND REGULATION 125 (William Taylor ed. 2006) (studying the development of the
city of Launceston in Tasmania, Australia and concluding that “the way in which a
town is conceived as idea . . . influences both the legal description and distribution of
urban space and the distribution of events within it”).
150. Babie, supra note 65, at 352; see also Gordon Clark, The Geography of Law, in
1 NEW MODELS IN GEOGRAPHY: THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 310 (Rich-
ard Peet & Nigel Thrift eds., 1989) (“The links between law and society, between law
and geography, are indissoluble since as law is drawn from society it also reproduces
society. And as law is structured by context, it structures context.”).
151. Blomley, supra note 38, at 581–82.
152. Low & Lawrence-Zúñiga, supra note 8, at 18 (“[C]ontested spaces” are de-
fined “as geographic locations where conflicts in the form of opposition, confronta-
tion, subversion, and/or resistance engage actors whose social positions are defined by
differential control of resources and access to power.”).
153. See, e.g., id. at 20 (discussing the “contentiously produced” planning, design,
and construction of the city and its encoded “intentions and aspirations”).
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Such coordination in the face of disruption quite often necessitates a
change in the legal landscape to fit the emerging social environment
and physical landscape. Similarly, if we want to prevent or diminish
prevalence of new uses, we must also consider how land-use controls
can be used to accomplish such limits even if the activity changes from
unlawful to technically “lawful.”
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article reminds us that old battles will often resurface with
new products and different players. So too can we understand some of
the power relationships and interest-group concerns involved in the
new battles surrounding marijuana from reference to the past, includ-
ing the self-interested preservation of incumbent positions. In that
sense, much of the property-related concerns associated with
decriminalization, legalization, or relaxation of marijuana laws are
predictable. Nonetheless, it is useful and critical to carefully examine
the past in order to understand the present, to seek to alter the path
away from its predicted course if and when prudent, to plan for the
future, and to evaluate along the way. In the end, the character of the
spaces and places we inhabit and in which we conduct our business
and social affairs are necessarily impacted whenever legality innova-
tions work to disrupt the incumbent landscape. Understanding many
of the dynamics involved, and the lessons available from similarly-sit-
uated past land-use legal developments, can help us shape how and
whether we want to resist, impede, control, accept, or embrace the
land-use disruption that marijuana-related uses will bring.
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